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Frege and Peano on definitions
Abstract. Frege and Peano started in 1896 a debate where they contrasted the re-
spective conceptions on the theory and practice of mathematical definitions. Which
was (if any) the influence of the Frege-Peano debate on the conceptions by the two
authors on the theme of defining in mathematics and which was the role played by this
debate in the broader context of their scientific interaction?1
Historical data
Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) and Giuseppe Peano (1858-1932) approximately
lived in the same years and was prominent pioneers of the then emerging
discipline nowadays knew as Mathematical Logic.
To the best of my knowledge, no meeting between Peano and Frege is
reported 2. However, evidence of a non-episodic interaction is provided
by two notes published by Peano on Frege’s work, two others by Frege
on Peano’s and by letters from Peano to Frege and unpublished writings
found in Frege’s Nachlass (see the Appendix for a, hopefully complete, list
and a tentative chronology).
Documentary evidence dates from 1891 (a draft of a letter from Frege to
Peano which is likely to be his first, answering to a previous dispatch of
writings by Peano) to 1903. There are evident gaps in the correspondence
which suggest that in that period contacts were more frequent they ap-
pear now. Moreover, nothing indicates in a definite way that any contact
stopped in 1903, even though from this time onward the interests of the
two author seem to diverge.
The scientific production of the two authors mostly overlaps on the follow-
ing themes:
• Creating and developing a symbolic language for mathematics (a
ideography).
• The analysis of the general logic laws used in mathematical reason-
ing.
1Part of the present note elaborates on data collected during my doctoral studies in the years 2007-
2009 at the Department of Mathematics “Giuseppe Peano” of Torino. I wish to thank Clara Silvia
Roero for her invaluable contribution in making facts about Peano’s work and life suitably available
to scholars and for introducing me to the methodology of the History of mathematics.
2Both Frege and Peano appear in the “Comité d’Honneur” of the First International Congress of
Philosophy (Paris, 1900), but Peano attended the Congress while Frege did not.
2• Foundations of arithmetics, analysis and geometry, with particular
emphasis on the analysis of the concept of natural number.
• Theory and practice of defining in mathematics.
Public and private discussions between Frege and Peano mostly deal with
contrasting the respective ideographies and principles of defining. In the
following paragraphs I will focus on the latter topic.
The debate on defining
“Defining in mathematics” is a central theme for both the authors. They
devote to this topic entire paragraphs in their main works and a num-
ber of other published or unpublished writings throughout their scientific
production.
Frege mainly gives a systematic account of his theory of definitions in the
two parts of Grundgesetze der Arithmetik (1893, 1903): in the first one
he describes the role he assigns to defining inside his symbolic system; in
the second part he states his Principles of definition. In between this two
moments, the discussions with Peano and Hilbert take place.
Peano’s writings on defining alternate between theorical statements on
definitions and applications to the definitions of a series of fundamental
mathematical notions (from the Area of a surface (1890) to Limit (1913)).
The main expositions of his ideas on the topic are in Notations de Logique
Mathématique (1894), in the framework of his symbolic language, and Le
definizioni in matematica (1911), more in general. The debate Frege-Peano
on defining lies between Peano’s symbolic and conceptual exposition of the
matter, as did for Frege.
The debate on defining also plays a central role in contrasting Frege’s
ideography with Peano’s: against Nidditch’s diminishing appraisal ([7], p.
108) there are the appreciations by Peano (quoted by Nidditch himself)
and Frege: “What is at stake here [the canons of definition] is perhaps the
deepest difference between the two concept-scripts” ([4], p. 152).
Frege’s Begriffsschrift (1879) and Grundgesetze I (1893) on one side and
Peano’s Notations (1894) and Formulaire de mathématiques, vol. 1 (1895)
on the other are the works the two authors mainly refer to in discussing
about defining in mathematics. In these works we can retrace some shared
principles which form the common ground for the subsequent debate:
• Definitions are nominal.
• Defining is an act of willing, not an act of judgement.
3• The purpose of defining is to abbreviate sentences (The principles of
non-creativity and of eliminability are implicitely assumed).
• A definition has to have the form of an equation of two homogeneous
terms: the definiens and the definiendum.
The documents According to the current knowledge, the debate Frege-
Peano on defining took place in the years 1896-1897. We extract a tentative
chronology from the full documentary evidence of Frege-Peano interaction
given in the appendix:
1. (6.07.1896) Frege, Über die Begriffsschrift des Herrn Peano und
meine eigene. Vortrag, gehalten in der ausserordenlichen Sitzung
vom 6 Juli 1896, “Berichte über die Verhandlungen der Königlich
Sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig. Mathematisch-
Physische Klasse” 48, 1896.
2. (29.09.1896) Letter from Frege to Peano. Frege asks Peano to publish
his letter in Rivista di Matematica.
3. (14.10.1896) Letter from Peano to Frege.
4. (4.04.1897) Peano (Studii di logica matematica, Atti della Reale Ac-
cademia delle Scienze di Torino vol. 32, 1896-97) refers to Frege’s
talk given 6.07.1896.
5. (1896/1897) Draft of a letter from Frege to Peano (undated).
6. (1898) The letter from Frege to Peano (29.09.1896) is published in
Rivista di Matematica (Lettera del sig. G. Frege all’Editore, R.d.M
vol. 6, 1898, pp. 53-59).
7. (1898) Peano, Corrisp.: Risposta [a Lettera del sig. G. Frege all’Editore],
R.d.M vol. 6, 1898, pp. 60-61.
8. (1897/1898?) Frege’s unpublished Begründung meiner strengeren
Grundsätze des Definierens contrasts Peano’s way of defining with
his own.
9. (1903) Frege (Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, begriffsscrhriftlich abgeleitet,
Band II, Jena, 1903, footnote to §58) refers to Peano, Risposta
(1898).
4The actual sequence of the above-mentioned documents cannot be estab-
lished with absolute certainty: we do not know if Peano knew the content
of Frege’s Leipzig talk soon after Frege delivered it (06.07.1896) or when it
was published (1897); we do not have elements for dating Frege’s unpub-
lished writings; and we do not know if Peano communicated to Frege the
final version of his Risposta before it was published in Rivista di Matem-
atica (1898) together with Frege’s letter (29.09.1896).
The debate In his Leipzig conference (06.07.1896) Frege, although con-
trasting his own view with Peano’s, focuses on aspects of the two ideogra-
phies which can be more or less suitable in achieving different specific goals,
within a (presumably) shared request for rigour in mathematical resoning.
He confines to a short paragraph the theme of definitions, which will re-
veal a strong matter of controversy: “The manner of defining, especially,
I find wanting in logical perfection. That the same symbol is explained
more than once is almost the rule. Conditional definitions are also very
numerous. As against this, I require that each sign be defined just once,
and completely, not several times over and in piecemeal fashion; I require
that the reference of the defining expression coincide unconditionally with
the reference of the defined one.” ([2], p. 4)
The debate properly starts with Frege’s critiques and remarks on Peano’s
definitions in the letter of 29.09.1896 (intended by Frege for publishing in
Peano’s Rivista di Matematica). The letter is presented as an answer to
Peano’s review of Grundgesetze I (appeared the year before in Rivista) and
the declared purpose is to argue against Peano’s claim that “the system
of the Formulary represents a more profound analysis” ([5], p. 113). In
particular, the main controverse point is the number of primitive symbols
in the two ideographies and, for correctly counting them, Frege is led to
carefully examine Peano’s definitions of a number of notions.
They remain two direct answers from Peano to Frege’s letter. The Risposta
published in Rivista in 1898 and the letter of 14.10.1896 (Reply), sent just
a couple of weeks after receiving Frege’s and conceived also as a reply to
Frege’s Leipzig talk.
Most of Frege’s technical points are accepted by Peano, in his first answer
or in the course of the debate, so that the irreducible nut of the disagree-
ment between Frege and Peano on defining can gradually emerge. The
problem manifests itself in the presence in Peano’s Formulaire of multiple
definitions for the same sign. The two authors discuss this fact sometimes
in general terms, sometimes referring to binary operations, like addition,
or to relations, like equality, as paradigmatic examples.
5Frege’s argument runs as follows. He requires every symbol to have one
and only one meaning for the sake of making inferences under the logical
assumption of the tertium non datur law. Hence, he claims that multi-
ple definitions of the same symbol assigning different meanings cannot be
allowed. Frege says that, in mathematics, apparently non-contradictory
multiple definitions can come under two patterns: the first one is repre-
sented by equivalent definitions the second by conditional definitions.
Frege’s distinction between sense and denotation makes the nature of
equivalent definitions particularly perspicuous: they are definitions which
assign to the definiendum the same denotation but not the same sense and
their equivalence is just a theorem disguised under the form of a multiple
definition.
About conditional definitions, Frege simply says that they are not defini-
tions at all, since they are incomplete, i.e., they lack assigning a meaning
to the definiendum in all possible cases.
Peano does not agree with Frege’s banish of conditional definitions from
mathematics, even though Frege himself envisages the possibility of amen-
ding conditional definitions as partial steps in a definition by cases, pro-
vided we prove the full definition to be complete, i.e., we prove that the
partial definitions are compatible and exhaust all possible cases.
Peano’s defence of conditional definitions appeals to the fact that there is
no limit to the possibility of extending the applicability of an operation,
like addition, by means of new definitions, both in principle and due to
the unpredictability of the progress of science.3
It becomes evident that, even on the way of defining, the disagreement
between Frege and Peano is rooted in the different aims the ideographies
of the two authors are intended to achieve. Frege was already aware of
these differences in his Leipzig conference and Peano, in his Reply, confirms
Frege’s speculations: “As you so well put it, my principal aim is to publish
the Formulary and not to deal exclusively with logic or with a particular
subject” ([5], p. 122).
In an undated draft of a letter to Peano (likely after Peano’s Reply) Frege
agrees to follow his collegue’s line of reasoning by discussing the relevance
of conditional definitions for mathematical practice. But even on this
common ground the two approaches dramatically diverge.
Peano’s approach to mathematical practice is naturalistic. He wants to
translate in his symbolic language all mathematical ways of expression and
reasoning. On the restricted area of definitions, a clear clue of this intention
3On different assessments of conditional definitions facing different purposes in Peano and Frege, see
also Quine [12, p. 42].
6is given by his project of having a census of all modes of definitions, a
project he sketches in his Reply and pursues in later works.
On the other hand, Frege’s approach is prescriptive. Even though in his
Draft to Peano he recognises the difficulties in doing other way mathemati-
cians actually do, he says that “logical requirements must not be suppressed
because of practical difficulties” ([5], p. 125), also distinguishing between
the moment of discovery and the moment of systematic presentation. The
conclusion Frege draws is sharply critical of mathematicians’ attitude to-
wards defining: “It is regrettable that there exists no agreement among
mathematicians about the principles to be followed in defining. To pro-
duce such an agreement would be a worthwhile task for a mathematical
congress. Complete lawlessness now prevails in this area, which is indeed
convenient for mathematical writers but damaging to their science. There
is not even agreement about what defining really is” ([5], p. 129).
Most of Frege’s arguments on defining which he refined in discussing with
Peano (as well as others more represented in the discussion, on the same
subject, with Hilbert) contribute to the mature exposition of the Princi-
ples of definition contained in the second volume of Grundgesetze (1903).
In particular, in a footnote to paragraph 58 ([4], pp. 160-161) Frege en-
tirely quotes the part of Peano’s Risposta which intend to defend mathe-
maticians’ habit of conditional defininig and substantially summarises his
critiques we have seen above.
Conclusions
The debate on defininig epitomises both the common ground from which
departed Frege and Peano’s work in mathematical logic (a symbolic lan-
guage for the regimentation of mathematical modes of expression and rea-
soning) and their different aims and approaches.
Frege stresses the fact that his Begriffsschift was designed for making infe-
rences (“our vernacular languages are also not made for conducting proofs.
And it is precisely the defects that spring from this that have been my main
reason for setting up a conceptual notation.” [5], p. 115), while Peano’s
ideography is conceived for expressing all the existing mathematics (“even
if we regard this ideography as only a graphic symbolism capable of rep-
resenting in a brief and precise form all the propositions of mathematics,
its importance is evident. Further, this criterion of being able to use a
symbolism as a language may be used to recognize whether it is complete
or not.” [10], p. 192).
Following the development of the debate we can observe a shift from an
7initial focus on the technical aspects of defining inside an ideography to
more conceptual and informal concerns about this intellectual task. As the
focus moves, the different motivations leading the work of the two authors
become more evident and, in the background, the different curricula also
play a role (as a matter of fact, Peano was a philosopher not more than
Frege was a working mathematician).
In the last, we can say that from the debate on defining re-emerges a fun-
damental distinction between Frege’s and Peano’s projected ideographies:
while the former is intended as a tool in analysing inferences made in the
mathematical language, the latter aims to be itself a (symbolic) language
in which to translate the mathematical discourse.
With some hindsight these differences in methodology and aims between
Peano and Frege ideographies were already manifest in the very origin of
the respective projects, long before the debate on definitions: “I believe
that I can best make the relation of my ideography to ordinary language
clear if I compare it to that which the microscope has to the eye.” (Frege,
[6, p. 6]); “On peut réduire toute théorie en symboles, car tout langage
parlé, et toute écriture, est un symbolisme [...] Avec un peu d’habitude
on transforme tout de suite les symboles en langage et réciproquement.”
(Peano, [8, pp. 41-42]).
However, the novelty of their proposals initially made the two authors
willing to emphasise similarities against other logical or mathematical ap-
proaches. The debate on definitions made Frege and Peano more aware of
the impact of their different purposes on the respective ideographies. They
initially perceived themselves as competitors selling a same product, but
soon they realized that their products was designed for different targets
within different projects.
Appendix: Documentary evidence of Frege-Peano
interaction
1. (1891) Peano (Principii di logica matematica, R.d.M vol. 1, 1891, p.
9, n. 5) refers to Frege, Begriffsschrift, 1879.
2. (1891 – 1894) Draft of a letter from Frege to Peano (undated).
3. (30.01.1894) Postcard from Peano to Frege.
4. (10.02.1894) Letter from Peano to Frege.
85. (1894?) Handwritten notes by Frege on the last page of Peano’s
letter (10.02.1894).
6. (1894) Peano (Notations de Logique Mathématique. Introduction au
Formulaire de Mathématiques, Turin, 1894, p. 3) mentions Frege in
a list of Mathematical Logic authors.
7. (14.08.1895) Postcard from Peano to Frege.
8. Peano’s review (Recens.: Dr. Gottlob Frege, Grundgesetze der Arith-
metik, begriffsschriftlich abgeleitet. Erster Band, Jena, 1893, R.d.M
vol. 5, 1895) of Frege’s Grundgesetze I.
9. (17.09.1895) Frege reads Über di Begriffsschrift des Herrn Peano und
meine eigene at the Mathematics section of the Congress of Natural
Sciences held in Lübeck.
10. (24.10.1895) Postcard from Peano to Frege.
11. (5.04.1896) Postcard from Peano to Frege.
12. (6.07.1896) Frege, Über die Begriffsschrift des Herrn Peano und
meine eigene. Vortrag, gehalten in der ausserordenlichen Sitzung
vom 6 Juli 1896, “Berichte über die Verhandlungen der Königlich
Sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig. Mathematisch-
Physische Klasse” 48, 1896.
13. (29.09.1896) Letter from Frege to Peano. Frege asks Peano to publish
his letter in Rivista di Matematica.
14. (3.10.1896) Postcard from Peano to Frege.
15. (14.10.1896) Letter from Peano to Frege.
16. (1896/1897) Draft of a letter from Frege to Peano (undated).
17. (4.04.1897) Peano (Studii di logica matematica, Atti della Reale Ac-
cademia delle Scienze di Torino vol. 32, 1896-97) refers to Frege’s
talk given 6.07.1896.
18. (11.08.1897) At the First Congress of Mathematicians, held in Zürich,
Peano gives a talk and distributes Formulaire de Mathématiques,
t. II §1, "Logique Mathématique", where he credits Frege for some
propositions.
919. (1898) The letter from Frege to Peano (29.09.1896) is published in
Rivista di Matematica (Lettera del sig. G. Frege all’Editore, R.d.M
vol. 6, 1898, pp. 53-59).
20. (1898) Peano, Corrisp.: Risposta [a Lettera del sig. G. Frege all’Editore],
R.d.M vol. 6, 1898, pp. 60-61.
21. (1897/1898?) Frege’s unpublished Begründung meiner strengeren
Grundsätze des Definierens contrasts Peano’s way of defining with
his own.
22. (1898/1899?) Frege’s unpublished Logische Mängel in der Mathe-
matik refers to Peano’s answer in R.d.M. vol. 6, 1898.
23. (20.07.1900) Peano (Formules de logique mathèmatiques, R.d.M vol.
7, 1900) mentions Frege as the author of an ideography.
24. (7.01.1903) Postcard from Peano to Frege.
25. Frege (Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, begriffsscrhriftlich abgeleitet,
Band II, Jena, 1903, footnote to §58) refers to Peano, Risposta
(1898).
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